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In recent decades, major regulatory reforms have changed the role of the state in the liberalised and convergent
communications sectors of developed economies worldwide. The central characteristics of this transformed statehood in
communications are, inter alia, a rising importance of independent national regulatory agencies (NRAs) and a growing
reliance on alternative modes of regulation, i.e. self- and co-regulation. While the advent and activities of NRAs are often
analysed in current literature, the institutional variety and regulatory contributions of private actors through self- and co-
regulation are largely neglected. This article contributes to closing this research gap. A newly developed classiﬁcation
scheme of regulatory modes makes it possible to grasp the numerous and often intertwined contributions of both state and
private actors. Furthermore, a case study of Austrian regulatory institutions active in the convergent communications
sector demonstrates the potential of this new analytical tool and provides an in-depth analysis of various kinds of self- and
co-regulation, which have substantially increased in communications regulation in Austria in the past decade.
r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Since the 1980s major changes in institutional arrangements have come about in the regulatory systems of
communications sectors of developed economies worldwide in general and EU-wide in particular, where
liberalisation has entailed, among other things, the shifting of regulatory responsibilities from state
administrations to NRAs. Along with convergence it has resulted in the establishment of integrated regulators
for telecommunications and broadcasting, which are partly responsible for Internet matters as well. Such
NRAs exist, for instance, in Austria, Italy and the United Kingdom,1 although with varying designs ande front matter r 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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he Austrian Regulatory Authority for Telecommunications and Broadcasting (RTR-GmbH) and in Italy the Autorita` per
le comunicazioni (AGCOM). In the UK the competencies of the Broadcasting Standards Commission (BSC), the
levision Commission (ITC), the Radio Authority, the Radiocommunications Agency and OFTEL are merged in the Ofﬁce
tions (OFCOM) that assumed its powers at the end of 2003.
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M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170 153extent of institutional integration. NRAs2 are not only gaining importance in communications but also in
other policy ﬁelds.3 They are being discussed as indicators of a profound transformation of governance across
Europe and the USA, more precisely as indicators for the ‘regulatory state’ hypothesis, which argues that the
main function of the state has become the correction of market failures via rule-making at the expense of re-
distributive policies (Thatcher, 2002, p. 860; McGowan & Wallace, 1996, p. 563).4
State regulatory bureaucracies just as much as NRAs are the most visible parts of regulatory systems.
Accordingly, they receive most of the attention both in the public debate as well as in research. However, the
transformation of the institutional arrangement in the communications sector does not stop here. Against the
backdrop of globalisation in terms of technological innovation as well as trade liberalisation of goods and
services—predominantly pushed by the fast diffusion of Internet applications—many regulatory goals are
increasingly being pursued by less formalised means of regulation, i.e. by alternative regulation (self- and co-
regulation). Alternative regulation is carried out partly or even entirely by private or semi-private regulatory
institutions, and represents a further step away from traditional, politically dominated state institutions
towards indirect government, thereby serving as an additional but widely under-researched indicator of the
regulatory state hypothesis and of broad institutional changes in the governance of the communication sector
(Latzer, Just, Saurwein, & Slominski, 2003). Alternative regulatory mechanisms are gaining importance at the
international and national levels, e.g., ICANN5 for Internet domain names, ICRA6 for Internet content
rating, the Dutch NICAM7 for the classiﬁcation of audio–visual media content. These are promoted widely as
a supplement and/or alternative to state regulation—not only by the industry but also by various policy
makers, prominently by the European Commission.8 The European Commission is at the forefront of
developing a new legislative culture. In doing so it not only aims at reducing and simplifying traditional
regulative tools such as traditional command-and-control-oriented legislation (e.g., regulations and directives)
but also at encouraging alternative modes of legislation, notably self- and co-regulation. With this the
Commission has two objectives: ﬁrst, to increase the efﬁciency of reaching its policy goals and, secondly, to
increase regulatory legitimacy by including various stakeholders in the regulatory process (Senden, 2005). A
review of the literature on alternative modes of regulation, however, reveals that research on them is limited to
random, failed or best-practice examples, and that systematic analytical accounts are missing. Often it is
devoted to special sub-sectors only (e.g., advertising, press, eCommerce or telecommunications)9 and not to
the convergent communications sector as a whole, which in this paper is described as mediamatics (media and
telematics), comprising broadcasting, telecommunications, the Internet and the press (Latzer, 1997, 1998).
This paper intends to close this research gap. It develops a new approach that makes it possible to
empirically grasp and analyse the current institutional variety in communications regulation. Generally, there
are two dimensions to an analysis of regulatory mechanisms: the institutional dimension, which shows by
whom (actors) and how (processes) regulation is carried out, and the substantive dimension, which asks what is
being regulated (e.g., access, prices). This paper primarily centres on institutional arrangements of regulation,
which depict the special combination of regulatory norms and organisational speciﬁcs, and only to a lesser
extent on substantive changes. This results from this paper’s focus on the changing role of the state in
communications regulation. In other words, it considers whether recent regulatory reforms have led to the2Analytically, NRAs are non-majoritarian institutions (NMIs), which also comprise institutions as diverse as courts and central banks
(Majone, 1998, p. 10).
3For example, in environment, public health, energy, railways and water.
4It is beyond the scope of this article to give a comprehensive account of the ‘regulatory state’. For a recent overview see Moran (2002),
Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002) and He´ritier and Thatcher (2002).
5Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. For overviews and critical remarks on ICANN see inter alia Mueller (1999),
Froomkin (2000) and Weinberg (2000).
6Internet Content Rating Association.
7Nederlands Instituut voor de Classiﬁcatie van Audiovisuele Media.
8See, inter alia, White paper on European governance (COM (2001)) and subsequent communications, especially COM (2002). For the
reasons of this increased reliance on and advantages of alternative forms of regulation see Latzer et al. (2003), Latzer, Just, Saurwein, and
Slominski (2002).
9See, for instance, Suhr (1998), Nordenstreng (1999) for the press; Boddewyn (1985, 1988) for advertising; OFTEL (2000, 2001) for
telecommunications; OECD (2001) for eCommerce codes of conduct; and Schultz, Kaufmann-Kohler, Langer, and Bonnet (2001) for
online dispute resolution.
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M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170154transformation of a functionally understood statehood (e.g. the speciﬁc distribution of political responsibility,
tasks within and between states, applied policy instruments, structure of policy networks and organization of
regulatory institutions) in communications, one indicator of which is an increased reliance on private actors in
communications regulation, i.e. self- and co-regulation.10
To this end, this paper develops a novel classiﬁcation of regulatory institutions, which distinguishes
regulatory institutions by their degree of state involvement. This classiﬁcation is part of a wider analytical
framework containing several institutional parameters according to which the existing regulatory institutions
are assessed empirically, e.g., regarding their modes of establishment, operational scope and degree of
stakeholder involvement, as well as regarding regulatory processes and instruments employed (Section 2). This
approach makes it possible to grasp institutional regulatory variety in terms of public and private
contributions, and allows for a comprehensive overall picture of the existing regulatory structure. The
analytical design of this approach can be deployed in case studies of any advanced economy, in longitudinal
and comparative research. In this paper, the Austrian communications sector has been chosen as an
illustrative case, thus presenting the ﬁrst comprehensive study of the Austrian regulatory landscape for the
convergent communications sector as a whole (Section 3).
2. Classiﬁcation and analytical framework
Deﬁnitions and classiﬁcations of regulation vary widely in the literature.11 For the purpose of this paper,
regulation is deﬁned as collective intentional restraints on industry behaviour with the goal of achieving public
(economic and social) goals.12 From an institutional perspective, regulation comes in many varieties and is
generally not a binary choice between state or self-regulation: It takes place on a continuum between pure state
regulation on the one hand and pure self-regulation on the other, and can generally be understood as a
combination of state/public and societal/private contributions, which are closely interlinked (Gunningham &
Rees, 1997, p. 366). To grasp the institutional variety of regulation on this continuum empirically, the
classiﬁcation developed here categorises regulatory modes according to their degree of state involvement.
Deﬁnitions and classiﬁcations are not a matter of right or wrong, but more or less helpful analytical tools,
depending on the particular research questions and methodological approaches. As such—pursuant to this
paper’s interest in how statehood is being transformed in the mediamatics sector, how the fulﬁlment of
regulatory tasks is being divided between private and public actors, and how the institutional regulatory
structure is changing in the convergent communication sector—the emphasis is on drawing up in a
differentiated manner the varying contributions of state involvement in the different regulatory institutions. In
doing so, this approach distinguishes between ﬁve modes of regulation, which are listed below along with
examples from Austria and other countries:(1)10
state
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advaState regulation in the narrow sense, which comprises the legislative, the executive and the judiciary: for the
Austrian mediamatics sector especially, executive institutions such as KommAustria, the Austrian
Communications Authority.(2) State regulation in the broad sense, i.e. tasks related to national sovereignty, but at arm’s length from the
executive sovereign: e.g., NRAs, such as the two Austrian regulatory authorities for telecommunicationsThe approach to statehood adopted here is a functional one that focuses on control and regulatory tasks of the state. Transformed
hood comprises changes of policy—the content dimension, politics—the process and polity—the institutional setting. The trend
rds growing reliance on self- and co-regulation is one of the basic hypothesis of this transformed statehood in the mediamatics sector.
er trends would be, inter alia, from protectionism to the promotion of competition, from vertical to horizontal regulation, from detailed
lation to broad parameters and the separation of political/strategic and operative tasks. For details see Latzer (2000, p. 307ff).
For deﬁnitions of regulation see, inter alia, Black (2002), Baldwin and Cave (1999), Borrmann and Finsinger (1999), and Lessig (1998).
various terms/classiﬁcations of alternative regulation and their meanings see, e.g., Schulz and Held (2002), OFTEL (2000), Price and
ulst (2000), Gunningham and Rees (1997), Black (1996), Ayres and Braithwaite (1992), and Page (1986).
Further, regulation is limited to market interventions that go beyond the general rules of the game, limiting the freedom of trade and
ract (also Borrmann &amp; Finsinger, 1999, p. 8; and Mu¨ller &amp; Vogelsang, 1979, p. 342). This narrow deﬁnition of regulation
udes unintended effects (as opposed to Lessig, 1998), and other, non-regulatory market interventions brought about in the form of
ntages (e.g., tax breaks, exemptions from regulations), subsidies and taxation (Picard, 1989, p. 94ff.).
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M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170 155and broadcasting RTR-GmbH and TKK; the Italian AGCOM, Autorita` per le Garanzie nelle
Comunicazioni, regulator responsible for telecommunications, broadcasting and the press.(3) Co-regulation, which operates on an explicit unilateral legal basis, but does not involve aspects of national
sovereignty: e.g., OVE/OEK, Austrian Electrotechnical Association/Austrian Electrotechnical Commit-
tee; Switch, the Swiss organisation responsible for domain-name administration.(4) A private, but state-supported self-regulation in the broad sense: e.g., Stopline, Austrian hotline for illegal
Internet content; CRTC Interconnection Steering Committee (CISC), a Canadian institution responsible
for technical, administrative and operational issues of telecommunications with a special emphasis on
interconnection.(5) Self-regulation in the narrow sense with no explicit state involvement: e.g., Werberat, the Austrian
Advertising Council; Interessenverband Europa¨ischer Webmaster, formerly Adult Webmaster Network
(AWMN), a German institution of adult services webmasters.This classiﬁcation allows for a subtle differentiation and analysis regarding state/public and societal/private
involvement in the institutional regulatory structure. State involvement in regulatory institutions can happen
in many and inexhaustible ways, such as legal foundation13 (e.g., accreditation,14 ratiﬁcation,15 or supervision
schemes/mechanisms16), human and/or ﬁnancial resources17 (see Fig. 2). The identiﬁcation of these differences
in mode and degree of state involvement in the various institutions is essential so as to allow the classiﬁcation
of the institutions according to the classiﬁcation developed here and also for further institutional analysis.
However, this does not imply that every institution that falls within a given category is in every aspect identical
with other institutions within the same category. For example, two institutions can be classiﬁed as co-
regulatory institutions, the decisive criteria for which is strong state involvement by way of an explicit
unilateral legal basis, and that the institutions must not pursue sovereign tasks. Regarding other institutional
characteristics, however, there may be differences between these institutions, e.g., the state may contribute
ﬁnancially to one co-regulatory institution while it does not do so in the case of the other, or it may be
represented in one institution and not in the other. Classiﬁcation and grouping are important because the here-
applied analytical tools are intended for comparative and longitudinal research of institutional changes in
regulatory structures. A standardised categorisation is therefore necessary to survey, edit and analyse data.
Attempts to analyse all institutions according to all possible regulatory forms and individual variations
without categorising them in groups that exhibit certain characteristics would otherwise only result in a bare
list of possible regulatory forms without any further signiﬁcance.
The Austrian case study comprises two state regulatory institutions in the narrow sense and 23 further
regulatory institutions, which can be categorised as follows (see Fig. 1): three state regulatory institutions in the broad sense;
 seven co-regulatory institutions;
 six self-regulatory institutions in the broad sense;
 seven self-regulatory institutions in the narrow sense.For instance, the Italian Communications Regulatory Authority (AGCOM) is established by Law No. 249 of 31 July 1997.
For instance, Otelo or CISAS which provide ADR schemes in the UK. The sections 52, 53 and 54 of the Communications Act 2003
ire Ofcom to ensure that public communications providers in the UK provide access to dispute-resolution procedures and to approve
e procedures under certain conditions, following consultation with the Secretary of State. Two procedures have been approved so far
COM, 2005): (1) The Ofﬁce of the Telecommunications Ombudsman (Otelo, approved 30 September 2003) and (2) The
munication and Internet Services Adjudication Scheme (CISAS, approved 19 November 2003).
For instance, the Australian Communications Authority (ACA) ratiﬁes regulatory results of the Australian Communications Industry
ms (ACIF).
For instance, the Swiss Bundesamt fu¨r Kommunikation (BAKOM—Federal Ofﬁce of Communications) is responsible—according to
. 14 of the Verordnung u¨ber Adressierungselemente im Fernmeldebereich/784.104—for the supervision of Switch, the Swiss institution
omain names administration.
For instance, the French Internet Forum is ﬁnanced predominantly by the government, and state representatives are involved in the
ant committees.
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Fig. 1. Regulatory institutions in the Austrian mediamatics sector according to degree of state involvement. Key: AK-TK: Working Group
Technical Co-ordination in Telecommunications (responsible inter alia for the co-ordination of technical/administrative issues in
telecommunications); A-SIT: Secure Information Technology Centre Austria (responsible inter alia for security aspects in the context of
electronic signatures); Austriapro: responsible inter alia for EDI standardisation; BKS: Federal Communications Senate (inter alia
authority of appeal regarding decision of KommAustria); C3A: Certiﬁed Austrian Advertising Agency; E-Commerce Gu¨tezeichen:
Austrian eCommerce Quality Mark; e-Commerce Quality: e-Commerce Quality mark; GFBK: Common Film Assessment Board of the
Provinces; Internet Ombudsmann: Internet Ombudsman (incl. alternative dispute resolution); IPA/nic.at: Internet Private Foundation
Austria/Network Information Centre (Domain-Name-Administration); ISPA-Verhaltenskodex: Internet Service Providers Austria—Code
of Conduct; JMK: Austrian Board of Media Classiﬁcation (protection of youth by means of ﬁlm and multimedia content ratings);
KommAustria: Austrian Communications Authority (administers inter alia regulatory activities in broadcasting); ON: Austrian Standards
Institute; OPFB: Supreme Postal and Telecommunications Authority; ORF-Kontrollgremien: Austrian Public Broadcasting-Controlling
Bodies (ORF-foundation council and ORF-public/audience council); OVE/OEK: Austrian Electrotechnical Association/Austrian
Electrotechnical Committee; Preisunterausschuss: Price Subcommittee of the Parity Commission (social partners body responsible for
control of prices/decisions on price increases); Presserat: Austrian Press Council; RTR-GmbH: Austrian Regulatory Authority for
Telecommunications and Broadcasting; Stopline: hotline for illegal internet content; TKK: Telekom-Control-Commission; TU¨V: TU¨V
Austria Group (technical supervision); WebTrust: WebTrust eCommerce seal; Werberat: Austrian Advertising Council.
M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170156All the categories, their distinctive characteristics and the Austrian institutions identiﬁed are presented in
Fig. 1.
This classiﬁcation is part of a wider analytical framework, which consists of four groups of various
institutional parameters according to which the institutions identiﬁed were analysed (see Fig. 2). Generally, the
analysis starts with the identiﬁcation of the regulatory institutions and the degree to which the state is
involved, leading to the classiﬁcation of the regulatory institutions under one of the ﬁve regulatory modes. The
categorised institutions are then analysed according to the institutional parameters selected here. This provides
insights into their institutional speciﬁcs and design as well as their functioning (see Section 3). Institutions can
be evaluated according to many different possible sets of criteria. The institutional parameters for this study
were selected so as to cover many of the most prominent policy issues surrounding the employment of
alternative forms of regulation: For example, the data regarding stakeholder involvement and openness of
institutions to participation indicate, among other things, who is involved in the regulatory network, whether
there is a balanced representation of interests, what barriers to participation exist and what kind of regulatory
arrangement most likely facilitates broad public participation. The data with respect to the sanctioning powers
of institutions allow interpretations regarding the likelihood of compliance with regulatory decisions. If a
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Fig. 2. Analytical framework.
M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170 157regulatory institution can impose existential sanctions, for instance by revoking a license, it can be assumed to
have stronger regulatory powers than if it can only resort to reputational sanctions such as reprimands.3. Selected results from the Austrian case study
Empirical surveys of national or multilevel regulatory systems based on the categorisation and analytical
framework presented here18 mainly yield results on the institutional structure and less on the process and
efficiency of regulation.19
Until the 1980s, the Austrian media and telecommunications sectors exhibited the typical regulatory
structure of electronic communications sectors of developed European economies before liberalisation: The
national government played a pivotal role regarding the development and control of media and
telecommunications. Strong, sector-speciﬁc state regulations, particularly monopoly regulations and public
property in market-dominant companies, characterised both electronic media and telecommunications. In
recent decades, this traditional common pattern has been eroded, leading to a different role for the state,
which inter alia includes less formalised means of regulation and the increasing involvement of private actors
in regulatory processes (self- and co-regulation). This raises the question of whether the declarations of intent18This section presents selected ﬁndings of the empirical analysis of the regulatory structure of the Austrian mediamatics sector (Latzer
et al., 2002).
19It is important to stress that this article deals with processes and instruments within a given institution (e.g., rule-making, ex-ante/
ex-post enforcement) but ignores interactions between different institutions.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170158by policy makers and industry alike that they would increasingly employ self- and co-regulation are mirrored
in empirical evidence of growing alternative regulation. Ultimately, it is a question of whether there is
empirical evidence for a recent increase in self- and co-regulation as part of a wider common process of
transformation of statehood in convergent communications sectors of developed economies,20 and/or as an
indicator for the regulatory state hypothesis. If such an increase is evident, it consequently raises questions as
to its extent, the adequate division of labour between state and private actors, the applicability and
appropriateness of these new modes of regulation in regulatory practice, the (democratic) legitimacy of such
institutions to fulﬁl public policy goals and the potential risks inherent in such a development.
3.1. Establishment of regulatory institutions
The central question of this institutional analysis is, ﬁrst, to uncover whether there is empirical evidence of
growing self- and co-regulation in recent years, contributing to a transformation of statehood and to a new
institutional variety in communications regulation. To answer this, the following section takes a look at the
historical development of the institutional regulatory arrangement in communications in Austria. Moreover, it
shows regulatory patterns and gives some explanations for the establishment and deployment of alternative
regulation, as well as for changes in state involvement in the regulatory structure.
Fig. 3 provides relevant information on the establishment of the 23 Austrian institutions at the centre of this
study.212
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2Since the end of the 1990s there has been a sharp increase of self-regulatory institutions. This development
coincides with the Internet boom. All self-regulatory institutions founded since 1997, except for AK-TK
and C3A, deal solely with Internet issues (seven of nine). One may further observe the establishment of state
regulatory institutions in the broad sense, i.e. independent national regulatory agencies (NRAs). In
accordance with EU liberalisation and harmonisation policies, sovereign tasks have been delegated to
organisationally independent institutions.22 Altogether, more than half of the Austrian regulatory
institutions (13 of 23) were founded between 1997 and 2001. However, this is not to say that self- and co-regulation are totally new phenomena. They have long been a
constituent of the Austrian regulatory structure. Half of the alternative institutions (10) were founded
before 1990. They have traditionally been applied in technical areas (since the second half of the 19th
century) for issues such as standardisation23 and standards conformity assessment,24 for instance in the case
of electro-technical matters25 as well as in the press and advertising sectors, among other purposes for the
protection of minors, ﬁlm assessment and the promotion of minimum standards and fairness in news
reporting.26 Over time, some long-established self-regulatory institutions have been transformed into co-regulatory
institutions.27 Three co-regulatory institutions28 originally commenced their work as self-regulatory0See footnote 10.
1In total, 25 institutions active in communications regulation in Austria were identiﬁed, of which two state regulatory institutions in the
row sense. Because of this paper’s focus on new modes of regulation, the empirical analysis centres mainly on the 23 institutions
ntiﬁed in the other four categories, viz. state regulation in the broad sense, co-regulation as well as self-regulation in the broad and
row sense.
2The establishment of independent regulators is indicative of another trend in transformed statehood in the mediamatics sector, viz. the
paration of political/strategic and operative tasks’’ (Latzer, 2000).
3OVE/OEK, ON, Austriapro.
4TU¨V, OVE/OEK, ON.
5OVE/OEK.
6For example, Presserat, Werberat, JMK, GFBK.
7Such institutional changes from self- to co-regulation are also observable today, e.g., NICAM and Switch. NICAM, the Dutch
titute for the classiﬁcation of audio–visual media, and Switch, the Swiss institution responsible for domain names, started out as self-
ulatory institutions. NICAM was provided with a legal basis by the Media Act in 2000, and Switch in 2002 by the Verordnung u¨ber
ressierungselemente im Fernmeldebereich. Further, a co-regulatory approach for youth protection was adopted in Germany under the
endmedienschutz Staatsvertrag in 2003. Existing self-regulatory institutions may now be ofﬁcially approved by a commission for youth
tection (KJM).
8TU¨V, OVE, ON.
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Fig. 3. Regulatory institutions in the Austrian mediamatics sector according to year of foundation and degree of state involvement.
M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170 159initiatives in response to technical and security problems caused by the industrial revolution, which state
regulation could not counter owing to the lack of (ﬁnancial) resources and technical expertise. For these
reasons, and because of the success of self-regulatory efforts, state institutions later delegated further
regulatory tasks to these organisations and established them as co-regulatory institutions on a statutory
basis. Politically encouraged co-regulation (e.g., by the European Commission) has not yet resulted in new
foundations. Only one institution, active in the area of electronic signatures (A-SIT), was founded after
1990. An explanation could be that co-regulation takes longer to implement than self-regulation, as it is
based on an explicit unilateral legal basis and therefore has to meet certain procedural requirements that
self-regulation does not.
3.2. Operational scope and regulatory objectives
Another aim of this institutional analysis is to examine the areas of application of alternative regulation. To
this end, it investigates the link between the degree of state involvement in regulation and the operational scope
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Fig. 4. Regulatory institutions in the Austrian mediamatics sector according to operational scope and degree of state involvement.
M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170160of regulatory institutions (telecommunications, press, broadcasting, Internet) as well as the regulatory
objectives (content and user speciﬁc objectives, market power control, promotion of competition) (see Figs. 4
and 5). This approach mainly shows the sectors and policy objectives where a reliance on self- and co-
regulation is observable and those where state regulation is still the predominant regulatory mode. This
section also assesses the reasons for stronger public or private involvement (e.g., intensity of regulatory
intervention, conﬂicts of interest, industry expertise) in order to draw conclusions on the general applicability
of alternative regulation. Moreover, it gives insights into institutional regulatory patterns (e.g., regulatory
convergence, regulatory competition).2
ins
insIn terms of operational scope, most regulatory institutions (20) are active in the Internet sector. The reasons
for this large number are the existence of many single-issue institutions (eight), i.e. institutions responsible
only for one regulatory task (e.g., electronic signatures or the administration of the domain-name system or
alternative dispute resolution)29 and the fact that most institutions (12) that have traditionally been active
only in telecommunications, broadcasting or the press have extended their operational scope to the
Internet. The large number of institutions carrying out Internet regulation is an indicator of highly divided
responsibilities, but not of high regulatory intensity.9Eight alternative institutions are active solely in Internet regulation: one co-regulatory institution (A-SIT), four self-regulatory
titutions in the broad sense (Internet Ombudsmann, E-Commerce Gu¨tezeichen, IPA/nic.at, Stopline), and three self-regulatory
titutions in the narrow sense (E-Commerce Quality, WebTrust, ISPA-Verhaltenskodex).
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Fig. 5. Regulatory institutions in the Austrian mediamatics sector according to regulatory objectives and degree of state involvement.
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reg
beThe Austrian institutional structure supports the assumption that the Internet is characterised mainly by
self-regulation (eleven of 20 institutions). This can be explained by the self-regulatory tradition of Internet
regulation30 but also by the potential advantages of self-regulation over state regulation (e.g., faster, more
ﬂexible).31 State involvement in Internet regulation happens, as indicative of regulatory convergence, when it extends
its traditional operational scope to the Internet. All state regulatory institutions in the broad sense and all
co-regulatory institutions except for GFBK are active in this area. The degree of state involvement (as calculated by the number of institutions operating on a legal basis) is
higher in telecommunications and broadcasting than in Internet and press regulation. While the Internet
sector (eleven of 20) and the press sector (three of three) are dominated by self-regulatory institutions,
approximately three quarters of the institutions active in telecommunications and broadcasting regulation
operate on a statutory basis. There is a positive correlation between the degree of state involvement, conﬂicts of interest and the intensity
of regulatory intervention, which may be illustrated by the regulatory structure of the Austrian0Especially in the early years of Internet development, the prevailing view was to leave the Internet to bottom-up regulatory approaches
that governments should stay out of Internet governance (Netanel, 2000; Baird, 2002).
1Alternative regulation may be used as a makeshift solution, if traditional state regulation fails, e.g. with regard to transborder
ulatory problems such as content-related regulation on the Internet, or they may be chosen as an ideal solution. In such cases they can
expected to have certain advantages over state regulation (e.g., faster, more ﬂexible) (Latzer et al., 2003, p. 142).
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M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170162telecommunications sector. The stronger the conﬂicts of interest (e.g., between incumbents and newcomers)
and the stronger the intensity of intervention (e.g., restrictions on former monopolists), the greater the
reliance on state regulation. Accordingly, important regulatory competences in the Austrian telecommu-
nications sector are vested in state regulatory institutions in the broad sense.32 The low number of self-regulatory institutions in the Austrian telecommunications sector can be further
explained by the fact that various remaining regulatory tasks, which are suitable for alternative regulation
(especially technical and administrative issues), are carried out by one institution only (AK-TK).33 It is
argued that the existence of one representative and accountable institution responsible for a variety of tasks
makes for more successful alternative regulation.34 In terms of regulatory objectives, self- and co-regulation are not employed for market-power control.
Theoretical reasoning suggests that alternative regulation does not work well in the case of strong conﬂicts
of interest (see also above). Merger control, the control of abusive practices and the like are almost
exclusively performed by state regulatory institutions in the narrow and broad sense. Alternative regulation is predominantly employed where industry interests are more homogeneous as in the
case of user-speciﬁc objectives. More than two thirds of institutions (16 of 23) deal with issues such as
consumer and data protection, universal service, improvements in market transparency or user
empowerment. Generally, it is assumed that alternative regulation can react faster and be more ﬂexible
with regard to such issues, because the law is not able to foresee and regulate all future conﬂicts. In the case
of alternative dispute resolution, for instance, redress can be achieved more quickly as compared to legal
remedies through civil proceedings. There is regulatory competition with respect to eCommerce seals. Three institutions deal concurrently with
this task.35 While regulatory competition could result in a more efﬁcient regulatory output, negative effects
are possible as well. For example, there could be a reduction in transparency for consumers or insufﬁcient
information could be available. Regulatory competition often occurs when regulation is provided as a paid
service, for instance in the case of eCommerce seals or alternative dispute resolution.36 Consequently, the
competition between various self-regulatory institutions for new customers and earnings could entail the
danger of a ‘race to the bottom’ with standards continuously being lowered.37 Approximately half of the institutions (10 of 23) pursue content-speciﬁc objectives. Alternative regulation is
traditionally applied in this area because of likely conﬂicts of interest regarding state censorship and the
need for protecting the freedom of speech/press. Here, self-regulatory institutions deal mainly with issues
such as the safeguarding of minimum standards, e.g., in news reporting, or the prevention of demerit
content, such as child pornography. The fostering of merit content (e.g., cultural, regional and national
content) on the other hand is pursued with stronger state inﬂuence and mainly by other means of political
guidance (e.g., government aid for press and ﬁlm) than by regulation, understood as collective intentional
constraints of industry behaviour.38 The promotion of competition, e.g., by guaranteeing communications security or efﬁcient use of resources,
is dealt with by ten of 23 institutions. These activities are mainly aimed at bettering the conditions for
market development, where most market participants should beneﬁt on an equal basis, e.g.,
standardisation,39 or special aspects of communications security.40 The superiority of alternative regulation
over state regulation in technical areas is mostly argued on the basis of greater industry expertise.2Given that the telecommunications sector is heavily regulated by EC Community law, this also holds true for other EU member states.
3A similar structure exists in Australia, where ACIF (Australian Communications Industry Forum), a co-regulatory institution,
forms a variety of regulatory tasks. See Schulz and Held (2002).
4See, inter alia, Baeke, De Clercq, and Matthijs (1999, p. 29).
5E-Commerce Gu¨tezeichen, WebTrust, E-Commerce Quality.
6For a comparative analysis on various online dispute-resolution services including data on service-fees see Schultz et al. (2001) Schultz,
ufmann-Kohler, Langer, and Bonnet (2001). For comparative analyses on selected eCommerce trust marks/seals including data on
vice-fees see Nannariello (2001) and Nordquist, Andersson, and Dzepina (2002).
7For regulatory competition and self-regulation see Christiansen (2000).
8See Section 2 for the deﬁnition of regulation used here.
9Austriapro, AK-TK, ON, OVE/OEK.
0A-SIT, TU¨V, IPA/nic.at.
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Fig. 6. Regulatory institutions in the Austrian mediamatics sector according to involvement of consumer representatives and degree of
state involvement.
M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170 163Fig. 7. Regulatory institutions in the Austrian mediamatics sector according to entry barriers and degree of state involvement.3.3. Stakeholder involvement
A potential risk of self-regulation is that it is often considered as being self-serving on the part of the
industry—that special interests are pursued at the expense of public interests.41 Hence, from a public-policy41Further potential risks of alternative regulation include symbolic policy with weak standards, ineffective enforcement and mild
sanctions (see Section 3.4), regulatory capture, anti-competitive behaviour, a loss of know-how on the part of governmental regulators,
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M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170164point of view, overall possibilities for the participation of relevant stakeholders (e.g., consumer
representatives, social partners) and the openness of institutions to such involvement are important for
successful alternative regulation and are deemed essential to counter likely deﬁcits. Correspondingly, the
former EU Commissioner Liikanen (2001) even argued that self-regulatory efforts that do not provide for
sufﬁcient room for stakeholder involvement do not deserve strong political support. This section therefore
focuses on participation and representation in regulatory institutions. It shows who is actually involved in the
various regulatory institutions and if there is a balanced representation of interests in terms of industry and
consumer involvement (see Fig. 6). Moreover, it analyses the general conditions for stakeholder involvement
in terms of institutional openness and entry barriers (see Fig. 7):(fo
low
al.
4
4
ope
4
pub
4
(1)
(2)
Fu
othThe premises for the balancing of interests by means of consumer representatives’ participation seem to be
insufﬁcient. In the majority of alternative institutions (eleven of 20) there is no such involvement.42 Major
reasons for this are access restrictions (e.g., compulsory industry membership or nomination required) and
ﬁnancial barriers (e.g., membership fees). The integration of consumer representatives and corollary possibilities of reconciling various interests differ
between the various categories of regulation. There is no involvement in the case of state regulation in the
broad sense (zero of three). This is quite in contrast to the situation before NRAs were founded. Until then,
social partners (also representing consumer interests) had been heavily involved, in particular in state
regulation of telecommunications. Decreasing state involvement in alternative regulation correlates with
decreasing consumer involvement: It is best for ‘self-regulation in the broad sense’ (four of six) and co-
regulation (four of seven), where two thirds, or rather more than half of institutions exhibit such
involvement.43 The lowest level of consumer representatives’ involvement occurs in the category ‘self-
regulation in the narrow sense’ (one of seven). Combined with the results on the establishment of regulatory institutions (see Fig. 3) it is evident that
consumer involvement in alternative regulation decreases over time. While approximately two thirds of
institutions (six of ten) founded before 1990 integrate consumer representatives, the number decreases to
one third of institutions (three of ten) founded after 1990. Consumer interests are predominantly (two-thirds) represented by two major Austrian consumer
representatives’ institutions, the Federal Chamber of Labour and/or the Consumer Information
Association. Any other form of consumer involvement is quasi non-existent.44From the analysis of provisions governing admission to a regulatory institution, it is possible to draw
conclusions on the general preconditions for the balancing of interests. Generally, it can be assumed that the
higher the barriers to entry the lower the possibilities for participation and for reconciliation of interests.45otnote continued)
industry coverage and free-riding and insufﬁcient democratic quality (accountability, transparency and legal certainty). See Latzer et
(2003), NCC (2000), Campbell (1999), Boddewyn (1988) and Cane (1987).
2The analysis of social-partner involvement shows similar results (Latzer et al., 2002, p. 136f.).
3In the case of co-regulation the possibility of stakeholder involvement is often provided for by the law on which these institutions
rate (e.g., ORF-public/audience council).
4For example, the Internet users association vibe.at is involved in IPA/nic.at. The ORF audience elects six of 35 members of the ORF
lic/audience board.
5For the rules governing entrance this analysis distinguishes between:
Access possibilities: restricted access (completely closed or participation possible, for instance, by nomination, appointment, invitation)
vs. open access (mere formal admission).
Definition of target groups: narrowly deﬁned target groups (tight criteria for admission, such as compulsory industry membership,
independence, expertise) vs. widely deﬁned target groups.
rther, consideration is given to economic barriers such as the provision of human resources and ﬁnancial barriers (membership fees,
er funding).
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4
4
4
boa
5There are high barriers to participation. More than three quarters of institutions are characterised by
restricted access, narrowly deﬁned target groups or by being closed in respect to participation by outsiders. Approximately one third of institutions (eight of 23) are closed, i.e. regulatory tasks are solely performed by
members from within the institutions. Almost one third of institutions have narrowly deﬁned target groups (seven of 23), where admission is
subject to special criteria. Among these are compulsory industry membership,46 independence,47 or special
expertise.48 Furthermore, all these institutions—with the exception of AK-TK—have additional barriers in
the form of restricted access49 or ﬁnancial barriers.50 The openness to participation in alternative regulatory institutions rises with increasing state involvement.
As such, co-regulatory institutions are characterised mainly by openness (six of seven), wide deﬁnition of
target groups (ﬁve of seven) and low economic barriers (six of seven), i.e. participation is not—except for A-
SIT—subject to fees. In contrast, self-regulatory institutions in the narrow sense are either closed (three of
seven), characterised by narrowly deﬁned target groups (three of seven), and if participation is possible
(four of seven) it is subject to a ﬁnancial contribution.
3.4. Regulatory process and instruments
According to the literature, alternative regulation mainly occurs at the legislative stage of the regulatory
process and lacks proper enforcement mechanisms. Weak standards and poor instruments to sanction
malpractice are considered to be potential disadvantages of alternative regulation, which may result in mere
symbolic politics (NCC, 2000, p. 23). In this section the regulatory instruments applied—from rule making to
rule enforcement—were analysed in order to better understand the regulatory potential and practice of
alternative regulatory institutions. Results show at what stage of the regulatory process self- and co-regulatory
institutions are predominantly active, thus complementing traditional state regulation. Additionally, it
identiﬁes the applied regulatory instruments and the possibilities for alternative regulatory institutions to
sanction malpractice so as to draw conclusions on their applicability to various regulatory issues: Alternative regulatory institutions supplement statutory regulations by rule making and rule enforcement.
More than half of the alternative regulatory institutions (12 of 20) are active in rule making, e.g., by setting
codes of conduct or technical standards. Besides AK-TK and Austriapro, all alternative regulatory
institutions (18 of 20) are also active in rule enforcement (e.g., labelling, authorisation, allocation of
domain-names, conformity assessment). This is contrary to the assumption found in the literature that the
greatest degree of self-regulation occurs at the legislative stage (Swire, 1997). Rule-making activities by alternative regulatory institutions rise with decreasing state involvement. All self-
regulatory institutions in the narrow sense (seven of seven), half of the self-regulatory institutions in the
broad sense (three of six), but less than one third of co-regulatory institutions are active in rule-making. State regulatory institutions in the broad sense are only active in rule enforcement. They transpose the
predetermined objectives assigned to them. This corresponds to the hypothesis regarding the
transformation of statehood in the mediamatics sector that there is a separation of political/strategic
tasks, which are fulﬁlled by ministries, from operative tasks, which are removed from political
administration (Latzer, 2000). Self-regulation usually intervenes after problems have occurred. With decreasing state involvement ex post
rule enforcement increases while the intensity of intervention decreases in self- and co-regulatory
institutions (see Fig. 8). Only one co-regulatory institution (one of seven), but two thirds of self-regulatory6Stopline, WebTrust, Werberat, AK-TK, ISPA-Verhaltenskodex.
7A-SIT.
8IPA/nic.at.
9IPA/nic.at: invitation by IPA board; Werberat: nomination by the three committees of the umbrella organisation, Stopline: ISPA
rd decides on composition of hotline advisory board.
0Membership fees for A-SIT, ISPA-Verhaltenskodex, and Werberat; license fees for WebTrust.
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Fig. 8. Regulatory institutions in the Austrian mediamatics sector according to regulatory instruments along the regulatory process and
degree of state involvement.
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M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170166institutions in the broad sense and all but one self-regulatory institution in the narrow sense (Austriapro)
are active in ex post rule enforcement. The instruments used are mediation or sanctioning in the form of,
inter alia, the revocation of a quality mark. The fact that self-regulatory institutions resort mainly to
reactive measures and intervene after problems have occurred indicates their limited applicability to
regulatory issues requiring the possibility of strict preventive controls (e.g., due to the high risks of
regulatory failure and possible adverse effects on health and security). Self-regulation is characterised by weak enforcement mechanisms. Possible sanctions by self-regulatory
institutions in the broad and narrow sense are either non-existent (ﬁve of 13) or limited to reputation or
organisational sanctions, such as the withdrawal of quality seals (ﬁve of 13), public reprimands/’naming
and shaming’(two of 13), or the expulsion of members (one of 13). In contrast, all co-regulatory institutions
and two-thirds of state regulatory institutions in the broad sense, may impose existential sanctions by
revoking licenses or by denying certiﬁcation (see Fig. 9).51
4. Summary and conclusions
The starting point of this paper was a research interest in transformed statehood in the communications
sectors, under the inﬂuence of liberalisation, privatisation, globalisation and convergence. One of the1Only one institution among the self-regulatory institutions has the (limited) power of existential sanctions. IPA/nic.at may refuse to
ister domain-names under the ccTLD (Country-Code Top-Level Domain) ‘‘.at’’. However market entry is still possible for the
licant because he may register under another ccTLD or with a different domain name under ‘‘.at’’.
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Fig. 9. Regulatory institutions in the Austrian mediamatics sector according to strongest possibilities of sanctions and degree of state
involvement.
M. Latzer et al. / Telecommunications Policy 30 (2006) 152–170 167hypotheses regarding this transformation process is the emergence of a growing reliance on alternative modes
of regulation (self- and co-regulation) and thus an increased reliance on private actors in communication
regulation. While it can be widely read in the literature that self- and co-regulation are gaining more regulatory
importance, comprehensive empirical research is still scarce. This contrasts with the regulatory practice in the
convergent communications sector, where there is an impressive variety of different regulatory modes. Central
questions are how the relation between state and non-state regulatory actors has changed in the convergent
communications sector (mediamatics), if there is empirical evidence of growing alternative regulation and
whether there are institutional patterns regarding regulatory objectives, instruments, sanctioning mechanisms,
and stakeholder involvement, which correlate with the different degrees of state involvement in regulatory
institutions. The approach presented here is novel in two respects. First, it embraces the full spectrum of
national regulatory institutions in the mediamatics sector, comprising telecommunications, broadcasting,
Internet and the press. Secondly, given that self- and co-regulation are vaguely deﬁned concepts, lacking a
single generally understood deﬁnition, in line with its interest in a transformed statehood, the paper develops a
classiﬁcation scheme for empirical analysis that allows for grouping and analysing regulatory institutions by
their speciﬁc degree of state involvement. In this approach the simple dichotomy of state- vs. self-regulation is
transcended by adding three more categories of regulatory institutions (state regulation in the broad sense, co-
regulation and self- regulation in the broad sense). This makes it possible to provide additional insights into
the politically promoted category of co-regulation for example. The empirical results are as follows:
Within state regulation there is a shift of regulatory competence from state regulation in the narrow sense to
state regulation in the broad sense, i.e. NRAs. With regard to self-regulation, the paper argues that this is an
increasing but by no means new phenomenon. While it has a long tradition in technical areas and media
content regulation, it also enjoyed a sharp rise during the 1990s triggered by the Internet boom. Conversely,
there are not many new co-regulatory institutions. Due to the fact that several self-regulatory institutions were
transformed into co-regulatory ones in the past and that co-regulation is currently strongly politically
encouraged, it can be assumed that co-regulation may become more import in the future.
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regulation is not evenly distributed within the communications sector. While the state still plays a major role in
broadcasting and telecommunications, a plethora of new self-regulatory institutions can be identiﬁed in the
Internet sector, many of which are single-issue institutions. This indicates that responsibilities are highly
divided between the various institutions, which might entail problems in terms of visibility, but also in terms of
stakeholder involvement when such participation is subject to fees (multiple membership cost). The print
sector has traditionally shown a strong reliance on self-regulation with hardly any changes observable so far.
With regard to regulatory objectives it is evident that alternative regulation is not applied in the case of
sharp conﬂicts of interest (e.g., market-power control) and where regulation displays a high intensity of
regulatory intervention (e.g., limits on the market dominance of incumbent operators). Conversely, alternative
regulation is mainly deployed if interests within the industry are more homogeneous, as in the cases of user
speciﬁc objectives (e.g., consumer protection) and the promotion of competition to enhance the conditions for
market development (e.g., information security). There is regulatory competition between self-regulatory
institutions in the Internet sector (e.g., eCommerce seals), and regulatory convergence, which results from the
extension of regulatory scopes of existing regulatory institutions to the Internet.
Empirical evidence partly supports the often-asserted assumption that there is unbalanced representation of
stakeholders in alternative regulation. This results from high entry barriers such as access restrictions and
ﬁnancial barriers. While co-regulatory institutions are—by and large—open and accessible, self-regulatory
institutions in the narrow sense usually lack possibilities for representation and openness, thus hampering
equal participation of all stakeholders affected. Altogether, the involvement of consumer representatives in
regulatory institutions falls with decreasing state involvement. Hence, a more balanced stakeholder
involvement could be achieved through an increased deployment of co-regulation, where possibilities of
participation and representation could be prescribed by law.
Considering regulatory processes and regulatory instruments, the ﬁndings contradict the assumption that
the greatest amount of self-regulation occurs at the legislative stage. The analysis of regulatory processes (rule-
making/legislation, ex-ante enforcement, ex-post enforcement, sanctioning) shows that self-regulatory
institutions do not limit themselves to rule-making. They mostly resort to enforcement measures, especially
to reactive/ex-post regulatory instruments, but they lack strict sanctioning possibilities. Consequently, self-
regulatory institutions usually intervene after problems have occurred, which may be problematic in areas that
feature high risks of regulatory failure.
The empirical analysis shows an increase in alternative regulation in the Austrian mediamatics sector,
which, in combination with state regulatory institutions, is striving to achieve various public goals. This
development inevitably raises questions regarding policy implications as well as potential risks of alternative
regulation. Seen from a public-policy point of view, self- and co-regulation cannot replace traditional state
intervention. But this does not mean that alternative regulation is irrelevant, or (democratically) illegitimate.
On the contrary, alternative modes of regulation may be an effective way to deal with a control crisis of the
state by complementing state regulation. So the question emerges of the circumstances under which alternative
regulation can and should be applied in regulatory practice. Results from theoretical and empirical research
indicate that alternative regulation may be appropriate: if the risk of regulatory failure is low;
 if a low intensity of regulatory intervention is required;
 if there are no strong conﬂicts between public and private interests;
 if there are no strong differences in market power of the companies involved;
 if there is an already recognised organisation that could take over the regulatory task.Although any speciﬁc regulatory choice remains in the end a political decision, it should depend on a careful
evaluation of each particular criterion also taking into account their interplay as well as their degree of
intensity. Given that alternative regulation is still largely under-researched, the scholarly literature should
increase its attention and provide practitioners with sound theoretical and empirical knowledge to enable
decision making on a much more informed basis. The novel analytical tools developed and applied in this
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appropriate mix of state and alternative regulatory modes.
Moreover, there is a need for further comparative research on institutional patterns of state involvement in
regulation in order to assess commonalties and differences between national regulatory structures and
strategies. Comparisons may focus on alternative regulation in the mediamatics sectors of other countries, but
also on institutional variety in further policy ﬁelds such as biotechnology, thus providing a more
comprehensive insight into transformed statehood across policy ﬁelds.
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